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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990's, there was a growing recognition that
people with mental disorders could make important contributions
to society.' As a result, laws were changed to end discrimination
against the disabled.2  The Immigration Act of 19903 was
supposed to complement these changing attitudes by amending
the laws that excluded mentally disabled aliens. Under the old
immigration laws, mental illness alone was grounds to exclude
an alien.' The Immigration Act of 1990 added the requirement
1. See Juan P. Osuna, Vaccinations of Immigrants and Other Health-Related
Issues: An Update, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Aug. 1998, at 5.
2. See id.
3. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
4. See Helena Tetzeli, Medical and Health-Related Grounds of Exclusion: Recent
Law, Trends, and Practice, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Jan. 1997, at 2.
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that mentally ill aliens pose a potential threat to others to be
excluded.'
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration Act of 1990
specifically states that aliens could be excluded if they were
determined:
(I) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior
associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a
threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others,
or
(II) to have had a physical or mental disorder and a history of
behavior associated with the disorder, which behavior has
posed a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien
or others and which behavior is likely to recur or to lead to
other harmful behavior .... 6
Under this language, a mentally ill alien cannot be excluded
unless some kind of potentially threatening behavior
accompanies the disorder. In theory, this makes it harder to
exclude mentally ill aliens because not all such aliens exhibit
threatening behavior.7 This new classification also eliminates
the old system of excluding aliens solely because they fit a
particular medical diagnosis.8
Although the law now makes it harder to exclude mentally
defective aliens, the law has not gone far enough to protect these
aliens from discrimination. It is no surprise that people often
fear and mistrust the mentally ill.' The label of mental illness is
stigmatizing. Oftentimes, an ex-mental patient will be
discriminated against more than an ex-criminal.'
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999).
6. Id.
7. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, at 46, 435, 436, 481, 484, 487 (4th ed. 1994). Many of the disorders
listed in this book, including mental retardation, various anxiety disorders and phobias,
and dissociative disorders, have no harm associated with them. See id.
B. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, at 6732 (1990). In this report, The American
Psychiatric Association applauded Congress for turning away from the old system.
9. See Eva S. Stubits, Judgments of Dangerousness Mental Illness 1 (1977)





In its discussions, Congress implied that these concerns
would be abated by the passage of the 1990 Act. The Conference
Committee Report stated that many of the former mental health
exclusion grounds were omitted because they did not comport
with advances in medical science.'1 Congress also indicated that
the change in laws "complements changes made to other laws to
prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals." 2 In its
House Reports, Congress characterizes the old exclusion grounds
as "outmoded and inflexible," and the new grounds as
"enlightened and flexible.""
But is this really true? The standard in the 1990 Act for
determining possibly dangerous behavior is undefined. The
standard could extend only to those with prior criminal
convictions, 4 or it could extend to all aliens who may cause
psychological harm to someone else. 5 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) is left with a high level of discretion
to exclude an alien under the 1990 Act.16
This standard is not applied to aliens who do not suffer from
mental illness. There is considerable doubt whether mental
illness alone increases the odds that a person will commit
harmful behavior. 7 Under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), a mentally ill
alien posing a potential threat could be excluded from the
country, while it can be assumed that a non-mentally ill person
with the same characteristic could not." On its face, this result
appears to be discriminatory.
This comment criticizes § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), which excludes
mentally disordered aliens who may pose a threat to others. Part
II discusses the history of immigration laws that exclude aliens
with mental disorders. Part III examines the pros and cons of
11. See Daniel Levy, Exclusion Grounds Under the Immigration Act of 1990: Part 1,
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Aug. 1991, at 4-5.
12. Osuna, supra note 1, at 5.
13. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, at 6732 (1990).
14. See Osuna, supra note 1, at 5.
15. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 8.
16. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has the power to exclude an
alien at the U.S. border or port of entry on the basis of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999).
Aliens can also be excluded by consular officers of the State Department overseas, who
may refuse to issue a mentally defective alien a visa on the grounds that alien may pose a
"threat" to others. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 1.
17. See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, (visited Mar.
24, 2000) <http:/ness.sys.virgmina.edu/macarthur/violence.html>.
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999).
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the medical screening process. Part IV argues that §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) is unreasonable because it does not fulfill its
purpose and is because the statute is overbroad. Part V poses
the question whether this statute is constitutional. This
comment concludes § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) should be altered or
stricken because it is unreasonable and threatens the
constitutional rights of aliens.
II. THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAWS RELATING TO THE
MENTALLY DISORDERED
A. Federal Immigration Laws and Policies
Regarding the Mentally Ill
From the time this country was founded, there has been a
struggle between those who want our country to be a refuge to
everyone, and those who want to sharply limit admission." The
United States has a long history of excluding physically or
mentally defective aliens." In fact, the individual states barred
entry to mentally defective individuals until the middle of the
Nineteenth Century."'
In 1875, the Supreme Court ruled regulation of immigration
by the States violated the federal government's power to control
foreign matters." This ruling signaled the birth of modernfederal immigration policy.23 In 1882, the federal government
19. See ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF ALIENS 7 (1985). Ms. Hull opines that confusion has ruled our country's immigration
policy, and more often than not America has been a refuge to those who needed it. Ms.
Hull humorously comments on this confusion in a story about Vice-President Alben
Barkley. Chief Ben American Horse of the Sioux Indian Tribe once told Alben Barkley,
"Young fellow... [ble careful with your immigration laws. We were careless with ours."
Id.
20. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 2.
21. See id.
22. See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
23. See Jason A. Pardo, Excluding Immigrants on the Basis of Health: The Haitian
Centers Council Decision Criticized, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 523, 526 (1995).
See also Henderson, 92 U.S. 259 (holding that a state statute imposing a financial burden
on a shipmaster bringing alien passengers invaded Congress's domain, and thus was
void); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (holding state statutes imposing taxes on alien
passengers invalid).
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passed the first general immigration statute.2' The Immigration
Act of 1882 restricted admission for individuals suffering from a
mental or physical condition, and made specific references to
"lunatics" and "idiots."25 Surprisingly, the provisions of the Act
excluding mental defectives passed with little debate in
Congress, whereas other provisions excluding alien criminals and
public charges were more hotly contested."
The United States has continued to bar mentally defective
individuals throughout the years on grounds ranging from "one
or more attacks of insanity" to a "psychotic personality or mental
defect."27 This system of exclusion was further delineated by the
landmark Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.28 This Act
formed the basic structure of modem U.S. immigration policy,'
and continued the practice of excluding mentally defective
aliens."0
Prior to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, there
were seven health-related exclusion grounds. These were: "1)
mental retardation, 2) insanity, 3) previous insanity, 4) sexual
deviance, psychopathic personality, or mental defect, 5) drug
addiction or chronic alcoholism, 6) affliction with a dangerous
contagious disease, and 7) possession of physical defects or
disabilities affecting one's ability to earn a living.""' The 1990
Act eliminated the majority of these exclusion categories and
combined the remainder into a single three-part subsection.2
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) is a component of this three-part
subsection.
24. See Osuna, supra note 1, at 1.
25. See Pardo, supra note 23, at 527.
26. See E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
1798-1965, 414-15 (1981).
27. Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 2.
28. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.)
29. See Pardo, supra note 23, at 528.
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B. The Effect of Federal Immigration Laws and
Policies on the Mentally Ill
America has long utilized its immigration laws to keep out
mentally ill aliens.33 The United States excluded the highest
number of mentally defective aliens between 1911 and 1920,
when 42,129 mentally ill aliens were excluded. 34  Statistics
indicate that this number dropped greatly in later years."
However, the real number of mentally disordered aliens excluded
is probably much higher because these statistical numbers reflect
36minimums, not maximums.
There is a danger in leaving § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) on the books.
When the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)"7 was passed, there was a
strong public feeling in the United States that the number of
immigrants needed to be reduced.' One author argues that the
restrictive IIRIRA was passed to appease this anti-immigration
sentiment. This indicates that political forces, rather than
neutral forces, affect immigration policy.
Who is to say that if the political atmosphere in the United
States should so warrant it, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) will not be more
33. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 2.
34. See John F. Stanton, The Immigration Laws From A Disability Perspective:
Where We Were, Where We Are, Where We Should Be, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 441, 451 n.82
(1996). Stanton's article lists statistics for the number of mentally ill aliens excluded
between 1892 and 1970:











37. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-575 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IIRIRA]. IIRIRA made sweeping changes to immigration
law. In particular, it greatly reduced the number of due process rights available to illegal
aliens. See Lolita Buckner Inniss, Dutch Uncle Sam: Immigration Reform and Notions of
Family, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 177, 199 (1998).
38. See Alexander Tsesis, Toward a Just Immigration Policy: Putting Ethics into
Immigration Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 105, 106 (1999).
39. See id. at 106-107.
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rigorously enforced? If the atmosphere should become more anti-
immigrant in nature, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) may be utilized to keep
out otherwise acceptable immigrants. Additionally, if the
atmosphere becomes more biased against people with mental
disorders,"0 the same section may be enforced to keep out the
mentally ill.41 The recent reductions in the number of mentally
disordered aliens excluded under the immigration laws can be
attributed to the disabled population's movement,42 which
brought about changes such as the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA).43 Conversely, if the disabled population's
movement should die down, the number of mentally disordered
aliens excluded from the United States may increase. The
danger of leaving this statute on the books is that these
possibilities could become realities.
III. THE INS TESTING PROCEDURES
A. The Medical Screening Process
Medical inspections are conducted in three instances: 1)
when an individual applies for an immigrant visa abroad, 2)
when an alien presents herself for inspection at the U.S border or
ports of entry, and 3) when an alien seeks to adjust her status.
This section discusses what testing procedures are used for each
circumstance and what potential problems they pose.
The Public Health Service (PHS) establishes the procedures
for medically examining aliens.45 These procedures are published
partly as regulations and partly as official technical
instructions.46 When the PHS issues regulations concerning §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), they are required by law to consult with the
Justice Department. 7 This appears to be an added safeguard to
ensure that the INS accurately identifies which mentally ill
aliens may pose a threat to others.
40. See Stubits, supra note 9, at 1.
41. See Stanton, supra note 34, at 452.
42. See id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (Supp. II 1990).
44. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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Aliens wishing to obtain a visa abroad must apply for one
from a U.S. embassy or consular office.' The consular officer will
then require the alien to undergo a physical and mental
examination. Even if an alien is applying for a nonimmigrant
visa, a consular officer may still require a medical examination if
he feels that it is necessary.49 The U.S. embassy must appoint or
approve the physicians who perform these examinations." An
alien applying for a visa abroad cannot appeal a finding of
excludability.51 The procedure for inspecting aliens at the border
and for aliens adjusting their status is similar to that for aliens
who obtain visas abroad." Physicians conducting these medical
examinations must follow the technical instructions issued by the
Director. 3
After inspection, an alien may be issued either a Class A or
Class B notification.54 These class notifications apply to all types
of aliens, whether they are obtaining a visa abroad, presenting
themselves for inspection at the border, or seeking an adjustment
of status.55 The finding of a Class A condition will exclude an
alien. 6  Class A conditions include certain communicable
diseases, and physical or mental disorders that may have
associated threatening behavior. 7 Class A notifications cannot
be based merely on an alien having mental shortcomings. 8 The
finding of a Class B condition will not automatically exclude an
alien." Class B conditions include both physical and mental
abnormalities. These abnormalities are not necessarily
accompanied by a possible threat to others." Although a Class B
finding will not alone exclude an alien, it can be given great
weight when combined with other factors in deciding whether to
exclude an alien.1
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1996).
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (1996).
50. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 7.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.3(f) (1998).
54. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4 (1998).
55. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 7.
56. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (1998).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4(c) (1998).
60. See id.
61. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 7.
295
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An alien who is found excludable under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)
may appeal the decision to the Board of Medical Officers of the
PHS." This appeals process is open to aliens who were inspected
at the border or who are adjusting their status, but not to aliens
who obtain visas abroad.63 In reviewing the decision, the Board
considers the record, any necessary laboratory studies, and
statements made by the alien's physician.' The Board also
conducts its own independent medical examination of the alien at
their option." This means that an independent medical
examination is not required and that the Board can merely rely
on the record if it so chooses. The granting of an appeal is not
necessarily guaranteed. An alien's request for an appeal could
very well be refused.66
B. Problems with the Medical Screening Process
There are several problems with the medical screening
process. One problem is that the right people may not be
performing these exams. Many States have passed laws
requiring that a psychiatrist determine whether an individual
may be dangerous. However, Immigration Regulations do not
require that all of the examining physicians be psychiatrists.6
This means that the person determining that an alien is
potentially dangerous may not be the best qualified to do so.
Although an alien will have access to a psychiatrist during the
appeals process, there is no guarantee that an alien will obtain
an appeal."5
Another problem is that there may not be adequate time to
determine whether a mentally ill alien poses a possible threat to
others. In the 1983 case of In re Longstaff," a former
immigration officer testified that INS officers spent an average of
thirty-eight seconds inspecting alien's papers at the border.
62. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.5 (1998). The Board of Medical Officers is made up of three
medical officers, at least one of which must be a board certified psychiatrist. See 42
C.F.R. § 34.8(b)(3) (1998).
63. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 7.
64. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.8 (1998).
65. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.8(c) (1998).
66. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.8 (1998).
67. See Stubits, supra note 9, at 3.
68. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.8 (1998).
69. See id.
70. 716 F.2d 1439, 1446 (5th Cir. 1983).
296 [Vol. 31:2
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Although these aliens had usually undergone medical
examinations prior to their arrival in the United States, the
border officers still had the power to admit or deny entry to
aliens based on their visas." With only thirty-eight seconds
being spent on the perusal of visas, it is easy for an officer to
make a mistake. This is exactly what happened in Longstaff.
The alien in Longstaff was originally admitted to the United
States even though he was a homosexual at the time of entry,
which was a ground for exclusion. The officers inspecting the
alien at his time of entry did not ascertain his sexual
orientation.72  When the alien's homosexuality was later
discovered, he was refused naturalization.7 '3 A mentally ill alien
with associated threatening behavior could be treated this same
way. For instance, if such an alien manages to enter the United
States and the existence of his mental illness is not discovered
until much later, he could be later be denied naturalization. This
situation could be avoided if border officers spent more time
inspecting aliens.
Aliens do have the right to appeal an exclusion decision,
which can remedy any problems in the medical screening
process. However, this appeals process is not open to aliens who
obtain their visas abroad. This leads to the paradoxical
conclusion of rewarding those aliens who come to the U.S. border
even though there is a possibility such aliens could be turned
away and forced to go back home. It is as if the United States is
punishing aliens for not taking that risk.
IV. SECTION 1182(a)(1)(A)(iII) IS UNREASONABLE
Congress should revise § 1182 because it is not reasonable.
First, there is no proven link between mental illness and
violence, and thus the statute does not provide any additional
safeguards to protect U.S. citizens from violence. Second, the
disorders for which an alien can be excluded under the statute do
not necessarily have associated harmful behavior or the potential
of associated harmful behavior. Lastly, the wording of the
statute is vague. This vagueness can lead to an overbroad
71. See id. at 1445-46.
72. See id. at 1440.
73. See id. at 1451.
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reading and thus exclude more aliens from the United States
than the statute intended.
A. Mental Illness and Violence
There has always been considerable debate about whether a
connection exists between mental disorder and violence. In
previous years, research indicated that there may be a link, but
the research was not conclusive.74 Among criminal populations, a
greater percentage of inmates were diagnosed with schizophrenia
than any other type of disorder.75 Schizophrenics also had a
higher-than-average likelihood, .05%, of being implicated in a
homicide. 6 Although this sounds low, this rate is significantly
higher than that of the general population.77
There was also evidence that a connection existed between
violence and other types of psychotic disorders." In Sweden,
researchers examined the histories of a group of 15,117 people
from birth and found that criminal convictions were statistically
more prevalent among those adults who suffered from major
mental disorders. 79 The study did not indicate whether those who
suffered from minor mental disorders, which can also be grounds
of excludability under the 1990 Act, were more likely to pose a
threat to others. 80
During this same period, research suggested that there is no
link between mental disorder and dangerousness. One study,
conducted between 1983 and 1984, asked whether the presence of
a mental disorder increased the risk of violent crime among jail
detainees.8 Among the jail detainees examined, the researchers
found that the presence of mental disorder could not accurately
predict a future violent criminal act.82 The researchers concluded
the longstanding hypothesis that mentally ill people would
74. See MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIME, ix (Sheilagh Hodgins ed., 1993).
75. See id. at 64-65 (basing conclusions on research conducted by Hafner & Boker in
1973 & 1982, and by Taylor & Gunn in 1984).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at ix.
79. See id at x.
80. See id. at x.
81. See id. at 87.
82. See id. at 97.
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commit a violent crime after they are released from incarceration
is faulty."
Today, there is groundbreaking research that suggests there
is little, if any, connection between mental illness and violence.84
One of the most notable studies is the MacArthur Violence Risk
Assessment Study, which has been referred to as "the most
important study ever conducted in this area."85 The MacArthur
study analyzed whether there was a link between mental illness
and violence.8" Similar studies in the past have been criticized
for examining too small a patient sample or for examining too
few variables." The main reasons these deficiencies existed
were: "(a) inadequate predictor variables, (b) poorly defined and
inadequate measures of violence, (c) constricted samples, and (d)
unsystematic and poorly organized research efforts."8
The MacArthur Study attempted to solve these problems by
looking at a more comprehensive set of data. The study
examined approximately 1,000 patients located in three mental
hospital sites." After analyzing the date, researchers found that
there was "no significant differences in the risk of violence
between the inpatient and non-patient populations, absent
83. See id.
84. See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, (visited Mar.
24, 2000) <http://ness.sys.virginia.edu/macarthur/violence.html>. Some of this new
research suggests that any correlation found between mental illness and violence is due to
the presence of substance abuse. See Bruce G. Link et al., Real in their Consequences: A
Sociological Approach to Understanding the Association Between Psychotic Symptoms and
Violence, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 316, 320 (1999). The MacArthur Study found that "patients
discharged from psychiatric facilities who did not have co-occurring substance abuse
disorders were no more violent than their neighbors. However, substance abuse raised
the rate of violence among discharged patients by nearly five times, whereas it caused the
rate only to triple for the general population." VIOLENCE IN HoMEs AND COMMUNITIES
188 (Thomas P. Gullota & Sandra J. McElhaney eds., Issues in Children's & Families'
Lives Series Vol. No. 11, 1999).
85. Kirk Heilbrun & Gretchen Witte, The MacArthur Risk Assessment Study:
Implications for Practice, Research, and Policy, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 733 (1999).
86. See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, (visited Mar.
24, 2000) <http:lness.sys.virginia.edu/macarthur/violence.html>.
87. See Alison McChrystal Barnes, Competency, Coercion, and Risk of Violence:
Legal Intersects with Fundamental Issues of Mental Health, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 713, 720
(1999).
88. Heibrun, supra note 85, at 740.
89. See McChrystal Barnes, supra note 87, at 720-21.
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factors of drug and/or alcohol abuse."" The study concluded:
"mental illness does not correlate strongly with violent
behavior."9
Other current researchers support the theory that there is no
significant link between mental illness and violence. In 1993,
one researcher discovered that ninety percent of mentally ill
people are not violent." Another researcher, in a 1992 study,
pitched this figure even lower by claiming that the mentally ill
commit no more than three per cent of the violent acts in
America." Also, "epidemiological research shows that the
association between mental disorder and violence is slight." 4
This conclusion has been echoed repeatedly throughout other
publications.95
Even if a slight correlation between mental illness and
violence does exist, it is not significant. The effect of any
correlation is minimized since mental illness is a poor predictor
of violence.9" Other factors, such as gender, age and substance
abuse, are better predictors of future violent behavior." One
author commented:
If a community were to use the risk of violence as the sole
basis for the exclusion of people with mental illnesses, such a
community might just as well exclude men in favor of women,
teenagers in favor of people who are 50 years old, and grade
school graduates in favor of college graduates.9 3
Applying this rationale to § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), if the
legislature is going to exclude mentally ill persons who may pose
a threat to others, then they might as well exclude potentially
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See VIOLENCE IN HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 84, at 185 (Swanson
obtained this statistic by reviewing the findings from the National Institute of Mental
Health Epidemiological Catchment Area Study).
93. See id. (Monahan performed this study).
94. Charles M. Boisvert & David Faust, Effects of the Label "Schizophrenia" on
Causal Attributions of Violence, 25(3) SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 479, 480 (1999) (relying on
research done by Link and by Monahan in 1992).
95. See VIOLENCE IN HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 84, at 183. See also
Link, supra note 84, at 320.
96. See VIOLENCE IN HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 84, at 183.
97. See id.
98. Link, supra note 84, at 330.
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threatening aliens who fall into an unfavorable gender or age
group. In fact, it would make even more sense to do so,
considering age and gender are better predictors of violence than
the existence of a mental illness.
A close reading of § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) suggests that one of its
purposes in singling out the mentally ill is to protect American
citizens from possible threats of violence. If the mentally ill do
not pose a significantly greater threat than the non-mentally ill,
then the statute is not fulfilling its purpose. This makes §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) unreasonable.
B. Disorders for Which an Alien Can Be Excluded
Under §1182 (a) (1)(A) (iii)
A finding that an alien has a Class A disorder permits the
United States to exclude that alien.9 These disorders are
identified in the PHS Technical Instructions.' Class A disorders
include: (1) antisocial personality disorders, (2) impulse control
disorders, (3) paraphilias, (4) conduct disorders, (5) mood
disorders, (6) schizophrenic disorders, (7) alcoholism, and (8)
drug abuse.'0 ' Not all of these disorders are particularly
associated with harmful behavior."2  Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)
does not delineate which disorders should establish per se
excludability, and therefore it is unreasonable.
A growing body of research suggests that a connection
between violence and mental illness is mostly found in people
who have psychotic symptoms. 0' Not all psychotic symptoms
lead to violence.0 4 Researchers have targeted specific psychotic
99. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (1998).
100. See Levy, supra note 11, at 7.
101. See id. at 8.
102. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 7, at 218. People abusing the drug
cannabis, for example, do not have associated harmfiul behavior.
103. See VIOLENCE IN HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 84, at 187. This body of
research includes a 1996 study by Junginger that found a connection between violence
committed by the severely mentally ill and psychotic symptoms. See id. at 186. There
were also a number of studies about threat/control-override symptoms and their link to
violence. These studies included a 1995 study by Link and Strueve, a 1996 study by
Swanson, Borum, Swartz and Hiday, and a 1997 study by Swanson, Borum, Swartz and
Monahan. See id. at 187.
104. The term "psychotic," as used in the phrase "psychotic symptoms," has a variety
of different definitions. The term can be restricted to delusions or hallucinations or
expanded to include symptoms of schizophrenia, such as disorganized speech and grossly
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symptoms, known as threat/control-override symptoms, as those
that could possibly lead to violence.'0 5
Threat/control-override symptoms fall into two types. The
first type, threat, involves a person feeling threatened to the
point where they think violent behavior is justified . The second
type, control-override, involves a person looking at a situation in
such a way as to override their usual behavioral constraints."'
Not all psychotic symptoms are associated with violence because
the element of threat is not always present. For example, a
person hearing voices in his or her head would not necessarily be
connected with future violence, unless of course, those voices
were telling the person to commit harm.108
Of the disorders mentioned in the PHS Technical
Instructions, only mood disorders, schizophrenic disorders and
possibly drug abuse are associated with psychotic symptoms."°9
The other five disorders, therefore, should not be listed as Class
A medical conditions because there is no intrinsic threat.
Even though mood disorders, schizophrenic disorders, and
drug abuse have associated psychotic symptoms, their inclusion
in the PHS Technical Instructions is still over inclusive. Some of
the aliens suffering from these disorders will have no psychotic
symptoms at all. Drug abuse, for example, encompasses many
substances that produce no psychotic effects."' Depression,
which falls under mood disorders, is also not typically associated
with psychotic symptoms."' Even the aliens who do show
psychotic symptoms will not necessarily have threat/control-
override symptoms.
disorganized or catatonic behavior. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 7, at
273. It can also be defined as a gross impairment in reality testing or a loss of ego
boundaries. See id.
105. See Link, supra note 84, at 318.
106. See id.
107. For example, a person thinking God was commanding them to kill someone
would fit the definition of control/override because in that situation the person's normal
behavioral constraints against murder are overridden. See id. at 318.
108. See Link, supra note 84, at 318.
109. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 7, at 285-86, 232-33, 380. Drug
abuse is included in this list because there is considerable debate about whether
hallucinogen use can trigger psychotic symptoms in susceptible persons. See id. at 235.
110. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 7, at 218. Except for
hallucinogens, most of the drugs listed, such as cocaine, marijuana, etceteras, do not have
associated psychotic symptoms. See id. at 232-34.
111. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 7, at 327.
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Threat/control-override symptoms are only one subset of
psychotic symptoms."2 It has been suggested that symptoms are
a better way to predict who will become violent than are
disorders." 3 The PHS Technical Instructions make no attempt to
distinguish between aliens who have threat/control-override
symptoms, and aliens who do not. Although it would be difficult
to make this distinction within the three disorders that have
associated psychotic symptoms, it would be easy to eliminate the
other five disorders that have no associated psychotic symptoms.
The PHS, however, does not do this.
There is also a dangerous catchall provision within the PHS
Technical Instructions. This provision, which encompasses
physical and mental disorders not covered by the other
provisions, imposes per se excludability for disorders that limit
capacity and may have associated threat."4  This provision is
open to abuse.
In Morell-Acosta v. INS,"' a lawful permanent resident alien
who had been diagnosed with mental retardation was ordered
deported. The resident protested the deportation, claiming that §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) eliminated the practice of excluding aliens on
the basis of mental retardation."' However, the reviewing court
countered, while mental retardation could no longer be a per se
reason for exclusion, an alien could still be excluded if their
mental disorder causes them to be a potential threat." 7 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the deportation order,"8 and in so doing
implicitly classified mental retardation to be a mental disorder
under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).
Finally, the disorders listed in the PHS Technical
Instructions do not match current research findings on predictors
of violence. The instructions should therefore be revised so that
they are not over inclusive.
112. See Link, supra note 84, at 319. In the Psychiatric Epidemiology Research
Interview's psychotic symptom scale, thirteen items indicative of psychoses were listed.
Of these thirteen, only three were threat/control-override symptoms. See id.
113. See VIOLENCE IN HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 84, at 190.
114. See Levy, supra note 11, at 8.
115. No. 94-70442, 1996 WL 290037 (9th Cir. May 31, 1996).
116. See id. at *2.
117. See id.
118. See id. at *4.
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C. The Wording of § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)
One of Congress's purposes in enacting the Immigration Act
of 1990 was "to make it possible for aliens who do not pose a
danger to enter this country.""' Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) is
supposedly in line with this goal because it only excludes the
mentally ill who may pose a threat. However, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)
fails to define the term "danger" and therefore lacks the
concreteness of other statutes dealing with harmful behavior.
This lack of definition makes the statute unreasonable.
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) excludes mentally or physically
disordered aliens who may pose a "threat" or whose behavior may
lead to other "harmful behavior."2 ' However, this statute does
not tell us which specific acts constitute threat or harm. 2'
Although Congress may have had some specific guidelines in
mind when creating the exclusion for mentally ill aliens, it failed
to convey them in the drafting process.
The result is that "danger" under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) is left to
a wide range of interpretations. For example, a schizophrenic
who damages property or people can be considered "dangerous"
under the statute.'22 So can aliens who suffer from behavioral
disorders that are not violent, but still pose a threat to others.1
23
With all of the above, the finding of past criminal behavior or a
conviction is not necessary to exclude an alien under §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)." 4  The notion of dangerousness under the
statute can even be taken to ridiculous extremes. According to
the Foreign Affairs Manual, an alien merely causing
psychological harm to someone can qualify as "dangerous" under
the statute.22
Congress may not have intended for the word "threat" under
the statute to be so liberally defined. In its House Reports,
Congress asserts that an alien who was involved in minor
incidents, such as a street fight many years ago, was not meant
119. H.R. REP. No. 101-723, at 6733 (1990).
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999).
121. See id.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 101-723, at 6734 (1990).
123. See id. Antisocial personality disorder and exhibitionism are two examples of
behavioral disorders that may not be violent, but may still pose a threat to others.
124. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 8.
125. See id.
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to fall within this definition of "threat."126 However, Congress has
legally left the door open to this possibility by not putting more
definitive guidelines into the statute.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 1182(a)(1)(A)(III)
A. The Standard of Review for the Exclusion of
Aliens Under §1 182(a)(1)(A)(III)
Courts use the facially legitimate and bona fide standard to
determine whether the exclusion of an alien under §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) is proper."' The meaning of this standard is
difficult to define. On the surface, it appears that if an agency
advances a reason for excluding an alien that is legitimate on its
face, a court will not look behind the reason to see if the record
supports it."12 In Cuban American Bar Association, Inc. v.
Christopher,2 ' the Attorney General paroled Cuban children into
the United States while refusing the same to Haitian children.
The court permitted the action because the Attorney General
advanced a facially legitimate reason for doing so-the very
different political climates in Cuba and Haiti warranted the
different treatment. 0
Courts could also use the abuse of discretion standard for
determining whether an agency's decision to exclude an alien is
126. See id.
127. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). This case concerned a
Belgian journalist and Marxist theoretician who wished to come to this country to
participate in academic conferences. The Attorney General refused to grant visas, citing
security reasons because of the alien's communist affiliations. The Supreme Court, in a 6-
3 decision ruled that when the Attorney General advanced a facially legitimate reason to
refrain from waiving the exclusion by statute of an alien, the court would not look behind
those reasons.
128. See Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1992). Marczak concerned a
Polish seaman who had appeared before the INS officials requesting entry. The INS
officials refused, and subsequently put him in detention without parole. The INS's stated
reason for refusing parole was that they feared Marczak would flee to avoid being sent
back to Poland. See id. at 512. The Tenth Circuit Court interpreted the "facially
legitimate and bona fide standard" as requiring an individualized facially legitimate
reason for denying parole. See id. at 519. The court also, by looking at the practices of
courts in the past, concluded that the INS officials should come up with some factual basis
for their facially advanced reason for denying parole. See id.
129. 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).
130. See id. at 1428.
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justified. 3' The abuse of discretion standard has been described
as a decision "whether the information relied on by the [decision
maker] is sufficient to provide a factual basis for its reasons." "'
As the Tenth Circuit recognized, there is no real difference
between the abuse of discretion and facially legitimate
standards.'33
The problem with the facially legitimate standard is that it
gives the Executive Branch almost unlimited power to decide
which aliens can enter the United States."' Under this facially
legitimate standard, the Attorney General can advance reasons
for excluding an alien that are not supported by the underlying
record.'35 It has been the practice for courts to look at the
underlying record in order to determine whether the facts justify
the reason given for exclusion.'36 The fact that courts are not
required to look at the underlying record is manifestly unfair to
aliens who are excluded under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).
Hypothetically, the Attorney General can exclude a mentally ill
alien by claiming the alien may pose a threat to others without
there being any facts in the record to support this. Such an
action would be allowable because the reason given is facially
legitimate. The end result, however, would be the exclusion of a
mentally ill alien who poses no threat to anyone. This possible
result clearly circumvents the policy behind § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii),
which is to exclude only those aliens who may cause harm to
others.127
131. See Marczak, 971 F.2d at 516.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 517. The Marczak court conflated the two standards noting: "[b]oth
require considerable deference to the decision of the district director; both nevertheless
require a summary examination of the record." Id. The court supported this assertion by
citing to Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 853 (1985) (using both standards as if they were
synonymous) and Moret v. Korn, 746 F.2d 989, 993 (3d Cir. 1984) (reaching identical
holdings under the two different standards of review).
134. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc., 43 F.3d at 1427-28.
135. See Kleindienst v, Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777 (1972) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
136. See Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 517 (10th Cir. 1992). Marczak cited
Kleindienst, for the proposition that the Attorney General denied Mr. Mandel entry into
this country, claiming that Mandel had violated the terms of his earlier waivers of
exclusion. See id. The Kleindienst Court looked at the record to determine whether Mr.
Mandel had in fact violated these waivers, and thus satisfied itself that Mr. Mandel did.
See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 756-58, n.5.
137. The statute specifically singles out only those mentally ill aliens who may pose a
threat or have posed a threat in the past. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999).
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Although we would like to think that the Attorney General
would not give unsupported reasons for excluding an alien under
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), the possibility exists. Without the
requirement that courts consider the underlying record, there are
no adequate safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions. Section
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) should therefore be amended to provide for a
more stringent standard of review.
B. History of the Constitutional Rights of Aliens
Aliens used to be divided into two categories: 1) excludable
aliens and 2) deportable aliens.' Excludable aliens have no
substantive due process rights.3 ' In fact, excludable aliens are
considered to be not legally present within the United States,
even if they are physically on U.S. soil. 4 ' Because excludable
aliens have so few rights, it is often difficult for them to challenge
those regulations that exclude them. 4' Courts have held that
whatever procedure Congress uses to exclude an alien, "it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."' This
138. See Christopher R. Yukins, The Measure of a Nation: Granting Excludable
Aliens Fundamental Protections of Due Process, 73 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1504 (1987).
139. See Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
140. See Kathrin S. Mautino, Entry: What Mama Never Told You About Being There,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 911, 912 (1994). Ms. Mautino describes the three groups of aliens
physically within the United States as follow: "those who are here legally, those who are
here illegally, and those who are 'not here at all.'" Id.
141. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that aliens do not have recourse to
review under the Administrative Procedural Act. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker,
953. F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992). The Administrative Procedural Act provides judicial
review for persons who suffered wrongs caused by agency actions, however, review is not
available if other statutes preclude it. See id. at 1505. Because the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA) is meant to be the "sole and exclusive avenue for judicial
review," excludable aliens are effectively precluded from other measures. Id. at 1506.
142. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). In Knauff, a German-born
woman had married a naturalized U.S. citizen. See id. at 539. Before she was married,
she had worked in various military-related jobs, including jobs at the Royal Air Force in
England and the War Department of the United States in Germany. See id. Upon
marriage, she sought entry into the U.S. to be naturalized. See id. The U.S. excluded her,
for security reasons that it refused to divulge. See id. at 539-40. The statute that the
government utilized to exclude her also did not provide her with a hearing. See id. at 540.
The alien in Knauff probably would have been similarly excluded under the present due
process rules regarding excludable aliens.
In Fernandez-Santana v. Chandler, No. 98-6453, 1999 WL 1281781, *1 (6th Cir.
Dec. 27, 1999), an excludable alien appealed a district court order dismissing his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. The alien is a Cuban national who came over on the Mariel
boatlift, and is serving a charge for aggravated assault. See id. The Court held that the
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standard partially stems from the belief that entry into the
United States is not a right, but a privilege. 4'
Not everyone agrees with the theory that excludable aliens
do not have due process rights. Justice Marshall, in his dissent
in Jean v. Nelson, argues forcefully that excludable aliens
possess due process rights.' One argument Marshall presents is
that excludable aliens must have due process rights because such
aliens charged with criminal offenses are afforded these rights.' 5
It would therefore defy common sense to grant excludable aliens
constitutional protections only when they have broken the law.4 '
Justice Marshall also argued that the liberty interest of
excludable aliens should be protected under the Fifth
Amendment because the United States protects the property
interests of foreign corporations.' It would therefore be
unreasonable for the United States to place a higher value on
petitioner had no Constitutional rights to due process, which is consistent with the
Court's reasoning in Knauff. See id. at *2. However, the court implied that the alien
might have had procedural due process rights if he had alleged that the review panel
failed to follow proper procedures. See id.
In Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit sent a
mixed message about the due process rights of excludable aliens. Chi Thon Ngo was an
alien seeking a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his prolonged detention. See id. at 392.
The court stated that aliens are entitled to substantive due process rights, and in some
cases are even entitled to procedural due process rights. See id. at 396. The actions of the
court, however, imply that excludable aliens do not have procedural due process rights
beyond what the law may give them. In other words, their due process rights are not
constitutionally mandated. The court ended up allowing his continued indefinite
detention because the INS made a few changes in their procedures providing for periodic
review of the alien's detention. See id. at 398-99. However, these procedures could easily
be perfunctorily performed, which almost makes it look like the alien has no procedural
due process rights at all. See id.
Although both Chi Then Ngo and Fernandez-Santana contain hints that
excludable aliens should have due process rights, neither case is strong enough to lead to
the conclusion that the alien in Knauff would have enjoyed a different outcome if she
brought her case today.
143. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
144. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Jean concerned a group of
undocumented and unadmitted Haitian aliens who challenged their continued detention
by the INS without parole. See id. at 848. The aliens claimed that the INS's actions
violated the Administrative Procedural Act and their equal protection rights. See id. at
849. Dissenting, Marshall vociferously opposed the majority's holding. He claimed that
under the majority decision, INS officials were left with almost unbridled discretion to
admit or deny parole to aliens. See id. Marshall expounded that the Constitutional
issues must be decided so that the Haitian aliens would have some protection against this
kind of discriminatory action. See id. at 858.
145. See id. at 873.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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property than liberty,' 8 Marshall also argued that excludable
aliens must have some due process rights because otherwise the
Attorney General would be able to take any action towards them
that was in line with a justified goal.'49 For example, the
Attorney General certainly could not stop feeding excludable
aliens in detention in order to save money." Marshall, however,
is working against precedent. Historically, the majority of courts
have held that excludable aliens do not have due process rights .
Deportable aliens have significantly more rights and
privileges than do excludable aliens.'52 Deportable aliens also
enjoy substantive due process rights."' These rights include
those Fifth Amendment rights that "No person shall... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
154
Deportable aliens have more rights because they have begun to
develop ties with the United States."' Once an alien begins to
develop ties with the United States "his constitutional status
changes accordingly.""'
In Tam v. INS," a deportable alien was detained for three
years. The alien filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his
continued detention violated his due process rights."' The court
conceded that the alien was due some level of substantive and
procedural due process rights, and granted him conditional
release."9
148. See id. (citing Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931)).
149. See id. at 874.
150. See id.
151. See Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (aliens seeking
admission to the United States have no procedural due process rights regarding
admission); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544 ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,
it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (echoing the holding in Knauff), Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) ("The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking
admission for the first time to these shores.").
152. See Tam, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (citing Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,
187 (1958)).
153. See id. at 1191.
154. Id. at 1191 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V. and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982)).
155. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).
156. See id. at 1428.
157. 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
158. See id. at 1187.
159. See id. at 1193.
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Both excludable and deportable aliens were affected by the
enactment of § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii). Excludable aliens were affected
because they may be directly excluded from the United States on
statutory grounds. Deportable aliens were affected because, in
certain circumstances, they may be deported from the United
States based on the exclusion criterion. For example, if a
deportable alien wishes to adjust his status to that of a
permanent resident, he must prove that he was admissible at the
time he originally applied for entry into the United States.16°
Thus, if a deportable alien entered the country after 1990, and
the INS determined that alien fell within § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) at
the time of entry, that alien can be excluded. This can happen
even if an alien has been present in the United States for years."'
A deportable alien also runs the risk of being excluded every time
he reenters the country after a trip for health-related reasons.
Although the INS will not look back to the laws in effect at the
time of the alien's initial entry into the United States, they will
look to see if the alien is excludable under any of the current
laws, which includes § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).63
C. The 1996 IIRIRA Act Changed the
Constitutional Rights of Aliens
In 1996, there was a strong anti-immigration feeling in the
United States." Polls revealed that the majority of Americans
wanted to lessen the number of immigrants coming to the United
States.6 ' In the midst of this politically charged atmosphere, the
IIRIRA was enacted.166  IIRIRA changed many immigration
provisions relating to undocumented and legal aliens.'67 IIRIRA
replaced the terms "exclusion" and "deportation" with the new
terms of "admission" and "removal." 8 The effect is that an
alien's status no longer hinges on whether he is excludable, but
160. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 4.
161. See id. at 4.
162. See id. at 2.
163. See Levy, supra note 11, at 4-5
164. See Tsesis, supra note 38, at 106.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Inniss, supra note 37, at 177.
168. See B. John Ovink, Why a Plea Bargain May No Longer Be a Bargain for Legal
Permanent Resident Aliens, 46 MAY FED. LAW 49, 51 (1999).
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on whether he is admissible.'9  IIRIRA also consolidated
deportation and exclusion proceedings into a single set of
proceedings known as removal proceedings.170 The result is that
aliens seeking admission and aliens being deported now face
many of the same removal procedures.
Although some groups of aliens had their rights reduced by
IIRIRA, lawful permanent resident aliens still retained due
process rights. This is because resident aliens have developed
ties with the United States, which proportionally increases their
Constitutional status. "' According to the Supreme Court,
procedures for deporting or excluding resident aliens must satisfy
due process requirements. 72
D. Due Process, Void-For-Vagueness and Equal
Protection Challenges to § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)
Lawful permanent resident aliens are affected by §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii). The government can deport a lawful
permanent resident if the alien was excludable at his time of
entry under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii). 173 The government can do this by
classifying a lawful permanent resident as inadmissible, which
gives the alien the same status as an alien who had never gained
admission to the United States. 174 The government is then free to
exclude the alien on the basis of any of the exclusionary rules,
169. See Charles H. Kuck, Window or Aisle: Removal and Expedited Removal Process
and Proceedings, in 1997-98 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK, VOL. II,
ADVANCED PRACTICE, 225 (1997). The article states that the issue of whether an alien's
been admitted determines whether removal proceedings will be instigated. See id. at 228.
170. This set of proceedings is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (1999). This new INA
statute instructs that removal proceedings "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has
been so admitted, removed from the United States." Id.
171. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1428 (11th Cir.
1995).
172. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
173. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 2.
174. See Colunga-Reyes v. INS, No. 91-70201, 1992 WL 175940, at *1 (9th Cir. July
23, 1992). In Colunga-Reyes, the petitioner was charged with three drug-related felonies
in 1986 (the charges were ultimately dismissed in 1988). Petitioner then left the Untied
States and re-entered the country in 1987 as a lawful permanent resident. In 1989, the
INS found that the petitioner had been excludable at the time of his entry because of the
drug charges and therefore he was depertable. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III
1997) (specifying that any alien found to be inadmissible as his or her time of entry can be
deported).
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including § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii). 175  Because lawful permanent
resident aliens have constitutional rights, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) may
be challenged as being unconstitutional.
1. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
mandates against depriving "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'76  Procedural due
process-the right to have notice and an opportunity to be
heard"'7 -is not specifically protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. " ' Aliens, however, have traditionally enjoyed
procedural due process rights. 9 Procedural due process rights
are invoked when one's liberty or property interests are
threatened.8 ' Aliens have a liberty interest, and accordingly they
must be afforded procedural due process rights.
Once rights to procedural due process are established, courts
look to the Mathews v. Eldridge8' test to determine what process
is due."2 The test looks at three factors: "First, the private
interest affected by the government action; second, the risk that
current procedures will cause an erroneous deprivation of the
175. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1999). This section is titled 'Inadmissible Aliens,' which
implies that the exclusionary rules contained in the section only apply to these kinds of
aliens.
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
177. See Laura Cullison, Note, The Jurisdiction of Administrative Appeals in
Nebraska: A One.Way Ticket, No Returns, No Transfers in Metro Renovation, Inc. v.
Department of Labor, 249 Neb. 337, 543 N.W.2d 715 (1996), 76 NEB. L. REV. 204, 215
(1997).
178. See WILLIAM B. LoCIHART ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONS 582 (1996) (referring to William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property":
Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORN. L. REV. 445, 450-52
(1977).
179. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (supporting the determination that
juvenile aliens have rights to procedural due process); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)
(finding that undocumented aliens, who were challenging their continued detention
without parole, should have access to the notice and procedures of court); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (determining that resident aliens who had been denied
certain governmental benefits were included within the definition of 'persons' covered by
due process). See also Todd G. Cosena, Preserving Procedural Due Process for Legal
Immigrants Receiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 2065, 2068 (1997) (stating that aliens have traditionally enjoyed
procedural due process rights).
180. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
181. 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
182. See Van Eeton v. Beebe, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1190 (D. Or. 1999).
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private interest, and the extent to which the risk could be
reduced by additional safeguards; and finally the Government's
interest" in maintaining the current procedures.'
The interest at stake here is an alien's right to live in this
country. The risk that § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) will erroneously
deprive resident aliens of this right is substantial. If a resident
alien is found to have a Class A condition (which makes her
excludable under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)), she has the right to an
appeal.' However, the INS does not provide attorneys during
these proceedings to indigent aliens.185 This leads to the risk that
an alien will be erroneously deprived of her rights because she
will not have someone to help her navigate the appeals process.
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) can also lead to an erroneous
deprivation of rights because it triggers removal procedures. In
removal proceedings, a resident alien's status is reduced to that
of an inadmissible alien. 8' Inadmissible aliens have far fewer
rights than resident aliens normally do.' Because the resident
alien's rights are reduced, she is left without access to procedures
that she would normally be entitled to. That is what happened
in Vo v. Greene.'88 In Vo, two resident aliens under final orders of
deportation were being held in detention. 9 Because their status
was reduced to that of inadmissible aliens, they were not
guaranteed access to certain procedures.' The petitioners were
"not guaranteed representation, a hearing, the right to testify, a
neutral decision maker, or the right to appeal an adverse
decision." 9' The court held that this denial was erroneous,8 2 and
183. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
184. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.8 (1998).
185. See id.
186. See Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999). In Zadvydas, a
resident alien was ordered deported and was subsequently held in detention. The alien
argued that, as a resident alien, he should have greater rights in these circumstances
than an excludable alien would. The court found that there was no real difference
between the rights of an excludable alien and those of a resident alien in this situation.
187. See Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Leng May Ma
v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)).
188. No. 98-WM-2427, 1999 WL 689301, *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 1999). Vo is slightly
different from the situation here because the petitioners in Vo were removable for having
committed aggravated felonies. See id. However, Vo is still analogous to this comment
because the government felt free to reduce their status to that of "inadmissible aliens."






that the aliens should have been accorded the same rights that
resident aliens normally receive.
The lack of adequate representation for resident aliens,
combined with the reduction of their constitutional rights, makes
it easier to remove them from the country under §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii). It is a reasonable inference that this could be
the government's interest in maintaining the current
procedures.194 The United States could also wish to keep the
current procedures for financial reasons. Because the current
procedures do not provide attorneys to indigent aliens during
certain appeals, they are arguably cheaper than procedures that
would. However, neither of these interests can outweigh the
minimum costs of additional safeguards. It is true that providing
resident aliens with access to more procedures under §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) would cost money. However, it would also save
money because it would lessen the number of aliens wrongly
placed in removal proceedings. An alien found removable under
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) could potentially be incarcerated.9 5 This
incarceration can be continued indefinitely.9 Incarceration costs
money and additional procedures under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) would
help reduce this cost. Until these additional procedures are
enacted, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) will continue to violate the
procedural due process rights of resident aliens.
2. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
If a statute is too unclear, it can be successfully challenged
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.'97 Courts generally look at
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Early American immigration policy has a long history of preferring immigrants
who are young, strong and healthy, over immigrants who are disabled. See Stanton,
supra note 34, at 444-45. The more aliens America can exclude under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii),
the more disabled immigrants it can keep out. See id.
195. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (1999). When an alien is in removal proceedings, the
INS is authorized to incarcerate that alien for up to 90 days. See id.
196. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a) (1998). This section specifically gives the INS permission
to indefinitely incarcerate aliens deemed inadmissible under § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii). To be
released from incarceration, an alien must be able to show by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he no longer poses a threat to the community. Id. It is within the district
director's discretion whether or not to release the alien. See id.
197. See Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that the term
'psychopathic personality' was too vague to give adequate notice that this phrase included
'homosexuality,' and was thus void under the void-for-vagueness doctrine); Kolender v.
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two factors to determine whether a statute complies with the
void-for-vagueness doctrine.' A statute will comply if 1) it
defines the offense with "sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited" and 2) it does
so in "a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement against those who must comply with
the statute."19  The rationale behind rendering vague statutes
void is to protect citizens, both from harsh consequences
stemming from actions they could not have known were illegal,
and from the discriminatory enforcement of the laws by
government officers.0
Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine is typically applied
to criminal statutes, 0 ' it can also be used to challenge
immigration statutes.2 "2 The rationale behind this is that many
immigration statutes provide for deportation, and deportation is
closely analogous with punishment.0 3 Aliens facing deportation
are oftentimes separated from close friends and family in the
United States, and if that is not punishment, it is hard to
imagine what is. 20 4 Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii), on its face, is not a
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (holding that California statute requiring persons found
loitering to produce 'credible and reliable' identification was void-for-vagueness).
198. See Armuchi Alliance v. King, 922 F. Supp. 1541, 1547 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
199. See id. at 1547 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
200. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (listing three distinct reasons for rendering vague statutes to be void: "(1) to avoid
punishing people for behavior that they could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid
subjective enforcement of the laws based on 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement' by
government officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms.") (quoting Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir.
1998).
201. See Armuchi Alliance, 922 F. Supp. at 1547.
202. See Le v. Waters, 863 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. CA 1994). Le concerned a
father and daughter who had left the country temporarily while their application to
become lawful permanent residents was pending. See id. at 1105. When they returned,
they were refused admission due to a statutory provision that provided that any
"abandonment" of the United States while a resident application was pending would be
grounds for terminating such application. See id. at 1106. This immigration statute was
examined under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and was not found to be
unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 1108-09. See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223
(1951). In Jordan, an alien who had been twice convicted of defrauding the U.S. on taxes
from distilled spirits was ordered deported under a statute which required deportation for
all aliens who had been convicted and sentenced twice for "crimes involving moral
turpitude." See id. at 223-34. The statute was examined under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, and was not found to be unconstitutional for vagueness. See id. at 232.
203. See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due
Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 98 (1998).
204. See id. at 102 (quoting Judge Sarokin's concurrence in Scheidemann v. INS, 83
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
deportation statute but rather a statute that can prevent an alien
from being admitted into the United States."5 However, legal
permanent resident aliens can be deported under §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).2 0 6  Because deportation, which is analogous to
punishment, is the result of this statute, the statute may be
examined to see if it complies with the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.
The first issue is whether § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) defines the
offense with "sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited.""7 Here, the prohibited
conduct is having a disorder that may pose a threat to others.08
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) does not define the term threat209 nor
does it list which disorders fall within the term threat.10
Therefore, the statute appears to fail the sufficient definiteness
test.
In Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 1 the district court upheld the INS's
determination that Fleuti, a homosexual alien, was deportable
under a statute that excluded people afflicted with a
"psychopathic personality." The Ninth Circuit held that the
statute failed the void-for-vagueness test because the statute did
not convey "sufficiently definite warning" that the term
psychopathic personality encompassed homosexuals. 2 Just as in
F.3d 1517 (3rd Cir. 1996)). Judge Sarokin discussed the plight of a man who had lived in
the United States for thirty-six years, who had close family in the United States, and who
was being forced because of a deportation sentence against him to leave the United
States. See Schneidmann, 83 F.3d at 1527.
205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999). Section 1182(a) instructs that aliens who
fall under this section "are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the
United States."
206. See Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 2.
207. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
208. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999).
209. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
210. The relevant PHS Technical Instructions also do not list all the disorders that
could possibly fall under the statute, as it has a dangerous catchall provision under which
almost any disorder could fall. See Levy, supra note 11, at 7-8. See also Morell-Acosta v.
INS, 86 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996) (implicitly using mental retardation as a §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) disorder, even though the PHS technical instructions do not list it).
211. 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
212. Id. at 658. Two of the doctors connected with Fleuti's case disagreed as to the
meaning of "psychopathic personality." One doctor felt that Fleuti's homosexuality did
not fit the definition. See id. at 657. Because even the doctors cannot agree as to what
the term means, the term is too vague under the statutes. The Fleuti Court noted that
PHS also felt that the term "psychopathic personality" was vague and indefinite. See id.
at 658.
[Vol. 31:2
20001 EXCLUSION OF MENTALLY ILL ALIENS
Fleuti, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) fails to sufficiently warn people of what
conditions will satisfy the definition of the term threat. Threat
can encompass anything from committing a crime to merely
causing psychological harm to someone. 13 Because the term
threat is not defined, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) is too vague to pass the
void-for-vagueness test.
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) is distinguishable from cases where
the relevant statute passed void-for-vagueness scrutiny. Jordan
v. DeGeorge214 concerned an alien who had conspired to defraud
the United States of taxes on alcoholic beverages. The court
deported the alien, utilizing a statute that allowed such actions
against aliens who twice committed "crimes of moral
turpitude."15 The alien challenged this statute on the grounds
that the phrase "crimes of moral turpitude" rendered the statute
void-for-vagueness.210 The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning
that courts have used the phrase "crimes of moral turpitude" for
over sixty years, and thus its meaning could be determined by
looking at other cases.217  Unlike the statute in Jordan, §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) has only been around for ten years2 8 and thus
there is very little case law interpreting it.219 Because of this lack
of interpretive case law, there is no yardstick to measure exactly
what "threat" means, or what disorders are included under the
statute. Therefore, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) continues to lack sufficient
definiteness.
The next issue under void-for-vagueness analysis is whether
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) encourages "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement" against those who must comply with the statute.2 2 °
Common sense dictates that if neither "threat" is defined nor the
relevant disorders provided under the statute, then immigration
officials will be left with enormous discretion to determine which
persons fall within the statute's confines. The end result of this
discretion could be the arbitrary enforcement of the statute.
213. See H.R. REP. No. 101-723, at 6734 (1990). See also Tetzeli, supra note 4, at 8.
214. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
215. Id. at 223.
216. See id. at 229.
217. See id. at 230. Jordan cites, for example, the case of United States v. Smith ex
rel. Volpe, 289 U.S. 422 (1933), where the court concluded the crime of counterfeiting was
a "crime involving moral turpitude."
218. Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) was enacted as part of the Immigration Act of 1990.
219. Searches on Westlaw and Lexis revealed very little under the statute, outside of
the case of Morell-Acosta v. INS, 86 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996).
220. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
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This was exactly the problem confronted in Kolender v.
Lawson."' Kolender concerned a statute that required loitering
persons to provide "credible and reliable identification" to police
officers.222 However, the statute did not adequately define the
meaning of "credible and reliable identification."223 Consequently,
police officers had almost unlimited discretion when it came to
enforcing the statute.224 The court ultimately found the statute to
be unconstitutionally vague.22
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) lacks sufficient definiteness, and
according to the reasoning in Kolender, leaves far too much
discretion in the hands of immigration officials. As a result, the
statute must fail the void-for-vagueness test.
3. Equal Protection
a. The Rational Basis Standard
Under a rational basis standard of review, a statute will be
upheld if it is supported by "any rational basis."22 Rational basis
is a difficult way to attack a statute, as a challenger has the
"burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support
it."227  However, the fact that § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) targets the
mentally disabled gives us the ammunition to prove that it has
no rational basis.
228In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, an
operator of a group home for the mentally retarded challenged a
zoning ordinance that prohibited such group homes. The
operator claimed that this ordinance violated the mentally
221. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
222. Id. at 352.
223. See id. at 358.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 361.
226. LOCKHART, supra note 178, at 18 (referring to United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)). Carolene Products upheld the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting the shipment of filled milk, on the grounds that the product posed a danger to
the public. See Carolene, 304 U.S. at 147. The court decided this was a "rational basis."
See id. at 152-53.
227. Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 996 F. Supp. 1230, 1236 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
228. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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retarded persons equal protection rights.29  The district court
held that the basis for this ordinance was rooted in the "safety
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood."3 The
Supreme Court, however, believed that the zoning ordinance was
based on irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded. 3'
The Court struck down the ordinance because there was no
rational basis for assuming that the group home "would pose any
special threat to the city's legitimate interests."2 2
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) presents a similar situation because
it also targets the mentally disordered. The government's basis
for this statute is to ensure the safety of all persons within the
United States from violence and threats of violence. 3 However,
new research points to the lack of a connection between mental
disorder and violence.2 4 Because there is little evidence of a link
between mental illness and violence, there is not a rational basis
to believe that these aliens could pose a threat to others.
Therefore, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) does not meet the rational basis
standard, and cannot be upheld.
b. The Heightened Scrutiny Standard of Review
If a statute targets a suspect or quasi-suspect class of people,
courts should apply a more heightened standard of review.25 It is
more difficult for a statute to pass muster under this heightened
standard of review than under a rational basis standard of
review."' Heightened standards of review are applied to classes
of people who have historically been discriminated against.237
229. See id.
230. Id. at 437.
231. See id. at 448.
232. Id.
233. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1999).
234. See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, (visited Mar.
24, 2000) <http://ness.sys.virginia.edu/macarthur/violence.html>.
235. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a heightened standard of
review is required for a statute that uses a gender-based differential for drinking ages).
But cf. Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (treating a class of
persons with mental retardation as a quasi-suspect class such as to warrant a heightened
level of scrutiny for their Equal Protection claim).
236. In order to pass a heightened level of scrutiny, a statute has to bear a
substantial relation to the achievement of an important governmental objective, see
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197, or be "substantially related to a legitimate state interest," Martin,
840 F. Supp. at 1210.
237. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 470 (1985).
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The rationale is that statutes, which target a suspect or quasi-
suspect class of persons, are more likely to single out persons for
discriminatory reasons. 38  Thus, closer judicial scrutiny is
needed.239
Under the Supreme Court's analysis in Cleburne, laws
concerning the disabled have historically been examined under
the rational basis standard of review.24 However, in recent years
there has been a movement to provide disabled persons with
more rights.24' One example of this is the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,22 which gave substantially more rights
to the disabled.2 2 This Act also classified the disabled as a
"discrete and insular minority" who have historically been
discriminated against.2"  According to this definition, the
disabled should therefore be entitled to the heightened scrutiny
protection that other "discrete and insular minorities" have
traditionally had access to.2"'
The Connecticut Constitution supports this theory. The
Connecticut Constitution contains a much more expansive equal
protection clause than the federal constitution currently does.4 "
It provides heightened scrutiny when classifications are based on




241. See Osuna, supra note 1.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (Supp. II 1990).
243. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (the right to access to public accommodations
and commercial facilities), § 12162(aX1) (the right to access at least one passenger car per
train), § 12142(a) (the right to access bus and rail vehicles).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. II 1990)). The statute specifically states:
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society ....
Id.
245. See Nirej Sekhon, A Birthright Rearticulated: The Politics of Bilingual
Education, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1407, 1442 (1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court would be willing
to review legislation with more exacting scrutiny in the interest of protecting 'discrete and
insular minorities' from majoritarian tyranny.").
246. See State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 569, n.14 (Conn. 1999) (involving a criminal
defendant who was convicted of murder, first-degree manslaughter, and carrying a pistol
without a permit).
247. The Connecticut constitution provides: "No person shall be denied the equal
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indicate a possible change in the law that could eventually apply
heightened scrutiny to the disabled. One case, Martin v.
Voinovich,24 ' has already applied the heightened scrutiny to a
class of disabled persons despite the Supreme Court's decision in
Cleybourne.
Because § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) targets the mentally disordered,
we can examine it under this heightened scrutiny standard.
Martin applied a heightened standard of review to a class of
mentally retarded persons bringing an equal protection claim.24
Using a heightened standard of review, the court held that the
classifications in dispute had to be "substantially related to a
legitimate state interest."
250
Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) cannot withstand this test. In
Craig v. Boren,5 the court assessed whether there was a
substantial relation to a legitimate state interest by referencing
statistical data. The plaintiffs in Craig challenged an Oklahoma
statute that proscribed different legal drinking ages for men and
women. 252  The state's interest in the statute was to promote
traffic safety, and the court looked at the statistics to see if they
justified this goal."' The statistics did not indicate a significant
difference between traffic incidents amongst men and women of
the targeted age group. 4 Therefore, the court found the statute
failed to meet this heightened review test.
25
protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or
enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry,
national origin, sex or physical or mental disability." CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20. See also
Robert I. Berdon, Connecticut Equal Protection Clause: Requirement of Strict Scrutiny
When Classifications are Based Upon Sex, Physical Disability or Mental Disability, 64
CONN. B.J. 386, 387 (1990).
248. 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993). In Martin, a class of persons with either
mental retardation or developmental disabilities brought suit against various
governmental organizations claiming that they were being denied community housing
and other services in violation of their Constitutional rights. The decision in Martin was
rendered eight years after the Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
249. See Martin, 840 F. Supp. at 1175.
250. Id. at 1210. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court never
reached the question of whether the City of Cleybourne satisfied this heightened standard
of review.
251. 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976).
252. See id. at 192.
253. See id. at 199.
254. See id. at 200.
255. See id. at 204.
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Similar to the statistics in Craig, statistical evidence
regarding mental disorders fails to show a substantial relation
between § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii) and the government's goals of
protecting people from threat. The probability that a mentally ill
person will be violent is likely no more than ten percent, and may
be as low as less than three percent.256 Mental illness is also a
poorer predictor of violent behavior than other factors such as
age or gender.257 Taken together, this evidence indicates that
there is not a substantial relation between the statute's exclusion
of the mentally ill and the government's goals of protecting
people from threat. Therefore, it does not meet the Martin test
and fails the heightened scrutiny standard of review.
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been a growing trend towards ending
discrimination against the mentally ill. The legislature has
attempted to sympathize with the plight of the mentally disabled
by enacting laws to help them.258 Section 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii),
however, is a step in the wrong direction because it reinforces the
notion that the mentally disordered should be kept away. If this
section is not altered, the real threat will be the continuing
stigmatization of the mentally ill.
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256. See VIOLENCE IN HOMES AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 84, at 185.
257. See id. at 188.
258. See Osuna, supra note 1, at 5. See also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (Supp. II 1990).
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